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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
• The Earnings Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS) data accurately 
measure the proportion of employees in receipt of the national minimum wage 
across firms in Ireland. We use these data to: (a) carry out a detailed profile of 
minimum wage employment in Ireland, by examining the level and intensity of 
minimum wage employment across various sectors of the economy; (b) examine 
whether there was a greater increase in average labour costs in firms employing 
minimum wage employees following the 2016 rate rise, compared to firms with no 
minimum wage employees; (c) examine whether any changes occurred to hours 
worked, or the number of employees, in high intensity minimum wage firms 
following the 2016 minimum wage increase. 
• Regarding the incidence of minimum wage employment across firms in Ireland, we 
find that almost three-quarters of firms employ no minimum wage workers. 
Approximately 12 per cent of firms have less than 10 per cent of their workforce 
on the minimum wage. Just over three per cent of firms pay more than 50 per cent 
of their employees the minimum wage rate.  
• The intensity of minimum wage employment is greatest in the retail and 
accommodation and food sectors. Almost half of all firms in these sectors have 
some minimum wage employees. 
• Our analysis indicates that, following the 2016 minimum wage increase, average 
weekly labour costs increased by 5.4 per cent more in firms with 100 per cent of 
employees on the minimum wage relative to firms with no minimum wage 
workers. However, the evidence suggests that these higher labour costs were 
confined to very high intensity firms, with more than 50 per cent of employees on 
the minimum wage. These firms account for just 3 per cent of all firms. For firms 
with between 10 and 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage, we detect 
no statistically significant impact on average labour costs.  
• It is important to note that 2016 was a period of strong economic growth and that 
earnings, in general, were increasing throughout the economy during this period. 
As such, our analysis is framed in this context. If the minimum wage had increased 
by the same amount in a recessionary period, such as in 2010, when GDP growth 
was negative and average hourly earnings were declining, it is possible that certain 
sectors would have seen greater relative growth in average labour costs. 
• A unique contribution of our paper is the detailed study of overtime hours. We 
have shown that, in response to the 2016 minimum wage increase, firms with 
more than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage reduced the 
probability of offering any overtime hours to part-time workers by approximately 
six percentage points.  
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• There is some evidence of an increase in the number of full-time hours, which 
coincided with a decrease in part-time hours. This is consistent with theoretical 
predictions of labour-labour substitution whereby employers substitute from 
lower productivity to higher productivity workers following an increase in the 
wages of low productivity workers.  
• Finally, we do not find any evidence of a reduction in the number of employees 
among high intensity minimum wage firms following the 2016 minimum wage 
increase. 




Minimum wage policies, and their impact on employers and employees, have received 
a great deal of attention in recent decades. Much of the focus has been on whether 
minimum wage increases lead to negative employment effects for low paid workers. 
A priori, this depends on the nature of the labour market. In the case of perfect 
competition, a binding increase to the minimum wage may lead to a reduction in 
employment of minimum wage workers. However, in a monopsony setting, where 
employers have a degree of market power, minimum wage increases may have no 
impact, or may even increase employment. The empirical evidence in this regard is 
mixed. Several recent papers find no discernible impacts (see, e.g. Dolton et al., 2015; 
Hirsch et al., 2015), while others find negative employment effects (see, e.g. Clemens 
and Wither, 2019; Lordan and Neumark, 2018). Okudaira et al. (2019) attempt to 
directly link the employment effects to the level of market power of the firm. They find 
no employment effects in firms with greater market power and negative effects in 
firms with less market power. This supports the idea that regional or industry variation 
in the structure of labour markets (monopsony vs perfect competition) can generate 
different employment outcomes. Aside from the extensive margin, minimum wage 
effects may arise at the intensive margin due to changes in hours worked. There is 
recent evidence showing a reduction in hours worked of minimum wage employees 
following the uprating or introduction of a minimum wage (see e.g. McGuinness and 
Redmond, 2019; Stewart and Swaffield, 2008). 
 
A related strand of literature examines the impact of minimum wage increases on firm-
level outcomes, such as average labour costs and profitability. Harasztosi and Lindner 
(2019) carry out a comprehensive assessment of how firms in Hungary respond to a 
very large minimum wage increase.1 Not surprisingly, given the magnitude of the 
minimum wage increase, firms employing minimum wage workers experienced 
substantially higher average labour costs, relative to firms with no minimum wage 
workers, following the minimum wage increase. While this led to some job losses, most 
firms responded to the increased labour costs by raising their prices, suggesting the 
incidence fell mainly on consumers. Riley and Bondibene (2017) and Draca et al. (2011) 
also find an increase in average wages among firms employing high numbers of low 
paid workers following a minimum wage increase. Riley and Bondibene (2017) find 




1  The minimum wage went from 35 per cent of median wages in 2000 to 55 per cent in 2002. 
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precise channels are unknown. However, Draca et al. (2011) find that affected firms 
experience reduced profitability, with no evidence of productivity gains.  
 
In this paper, we use firm-level data to study the impacts of the 2016 minimum wage 
increase in Ireland. A significant advantage of our data is that they allow us to precisely 
identify the percentage of minimum wage employees within firms. Therefore, we can 
exploit variation in the treatment intensity across firms following a minimum wage 
increase. In the absence of such data, previous studies have relied on identifying 
treated and control firms using average labour costs within firms.2 We utilise these 
data to make three main contributions. Firstly, we carry out a detailed profile of 
minimum wage employment, by examining the level and intensity of minimum wage 
employment across various sectors of the economy. Secondly, we examine whether 
there was a greater increase in average labour costs in high intensity minimum wage 
firms following the 2016 rate rise, and whether this varied by sector and the level of 
minimum wage intensity within the firm. Finally, our dataset contains detailed 
information on hours worked within the firm, including overtime hours split by full-
time and part-time employment status. We use these data to analyse whether the 
minimum wage increase impacted the hours worked of employees within firms. We 
test for changes in the number of overtime hours, as well as the probability of any 
overtime hours being offered, following the minimum wage increase. To our 
knowledge, ours is the first paper to study the impact of a minimum wage increase on 
overtime hours in such detail. We also test for potential impacts to the extensive 
margin to see if the minimum wage increase led to a decrease in employment among 
high intensity minimum wage firms.  
 
Our analysis indicates that, following the 2016 minimum wage increase, average 
weekly labour costs increased by 5.4 per cent more in firms with 100 per cent of 
employees on the minimum wage relative to firms with no minimum wage workers. 
However, while high intensity minimum wage firms were impacted, our results 
indicate that for the majority of firms employing minimum wage workers, their 
average labour costs increased by approximately the same amount as firms with no 
minimum wage workers. Specifically, the increased labour costs appear to be confined 
to the very high intensity firms, i.e. those with more than half of their employees on 
the minimum wage. It is important to note that these high intensity (50 per cent plus) 
minimum wage firms account for just 3 per cent, approximately, of the total sample. 
We find some evidence of a reduction in overtime hours. There was a 3.5 to 
5.5 percentage point reduction in the probability that a high intensity minimum wage 




2  For example, Riley and Bondibene (2017) and Draca et al. (2011). 
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decrease in part-time hours in high intensity firms following the minimum wage 
increase, there is evidence of a corresponding increase in full-time hours. As minimum 
wage workers are more likely to be part-time employees, this is consistent with labour-
labour substitution, whereby employers substitute from lower productivity to higher 
productivity workers following an increase in the wages of low productivity workers 
(Fairris and Bujanda, 2008). We find no evidence of a reduction in employment 
following the minimum wage increase.  
 
It is important that evidence relating to minimum wage policies covers all aspects of 
the business cycle. Studies such as Clemens and Wither (2019) and Okudaira et al. 
(2019) provide insights into minimum wage effects during recessionary periods.3 
However, our analysis is framed in the context of strong economic growth and a 
buoyant labour market. When setting minimum wages, policymakers take account of 
prevailing economic conditions. The Irish Low Pay Commission takes into account the 
‘economic context’ when making yearly recommendations to the Irish government 
concerning the minimum wage.4 Therefore, providing a broad evidence base in periods 
of recession as well as economic growth is necessary. We provide evidence pertaining 
to the latter.  
1.1 POLICY BACKGROUND 
A minimum wage was first introduced in Ireland in 2000 following the implementation 
of the National Minimum Wage Act. The initial minimum wage was €5.58 per hour (or 
£4.40 in Irish Punts). There were several increases in the minimum wage in subsequent 
years. By 2007, the minimum wage rate was €8.65 per hour. However, following this 
there was an extended period of time during which the minimum wage did not 
increase. This coincided with a sharp, and prolonged, economic downturn in Ireland, 
during which time unemployment increased dramatically. In 2015, the minimum wage 
was at the same level as it had been in 2007, at €8.65 per hour. By this time, the Irish 
economy had started to recover from recession and unemployment rates were 
declining. The Irish Low Pay Commission was established in 2015, with the aim of 
providing yearly recommendations to the Irish government regarding the appropriate 
minimum wage rate. Their aim is to set a minimum wage that assists as many low paid 





3  Holton and O’Neill (2017) also show that minimum wages are particularly important in a recession. By protecting the wages 
of the lowest paid workers in the economy, minimum wages stop wage inequality from increasing substantially in 
recessionary periods.  
4  The Low Pay Commission’s 2019 yearly report and recommendations can be found at 
 http://www.lowpaycommission.ie/Publications. 
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In 2016, following recommendations from the Low Pay Commission, the Irish minimum 
wage was increased from €8.65 per hour to €9.15 per hour, an increase of 
approximately 6 per cent. This was the first time the minimum wage had been 
increased since 2007. It is this 2016 minimum wage increase that is the focus of this 
paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The data for this study come from the Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey 
(EHECS), which is a panel dataset that follows firms over time. This is a quarterly survey 
that collects firm-level data on average hourly and weekly labour costs across 
economic sectors in Ireland. The EHECS survey began in 2008. From 2008 to 2016 there 
were 195,231 quarterly firm-level observations. In cases where there is a gap in the 
panel for a particular firm, for example if they complete the survey in Quarter 1, do 
not complete the survey in Quarter 2, but complete it again in Quarter 3 of a given 
year, then the missing quarter may be imputed. Of the 195,231 quarterly observations, 
42,845 are imputed. We restrict our analysis to non-imputed observations, leaving 
152,386 quarterly observations. We utilise the pooled sample of quarterly 
observations to construct descriptive statistics and to implement a pooled difference-
in-differences estimator, which is explained in detail later in the paper. We also utilise 
the panel component to implement a panel estimator. In doing so, we work with a 
sample of firms with a balanced panel (of non-imputed data) for all quarters in 2015 
and 2016. There are 1,948 firms that meet this criterion.  
 
The data contain detailed information on average hours worked within the firm, 
including overtime hours of full-time and part-time employees. The sampling frame for 
the survey is taken from the Central Business Register (CBR). All enterprises with 50 or 
more employees are included as well as a sample of enterprises in the three to 49 
employee range. The EHECS data contain measures of the number of employees, 
allowing us to control for firm size. The key advantage of the dataset is that it collects 
information on the proportion of minimum wage workers employed within the firm. 
This allows us to clearly identify the minimum wage intensity of a firm. In doing so, we 
can measure whether firms with greater exposure to the minimum wage were more 
affected by the minimum wage increase. Most of the variables are well populated in 
the dataset, that is, there are not many missing values. One exception is overtime 
hours. Of the 152,386 quarterly observations, 71,052 have overtime information. Of 
the 71,052 observations, 6,011 record zero overtime hours. Therefore, our sample 
sizes when estimating models using overtime as the outcome variables are more 
restricted in terms of sample sizes.  
 
We pool all of the quarterly observations in the dataset to calculate summary statistics 
relating to the prevalence of minimum wage employment. The timeframe spans the 
years 2008 to 2016. Table 2.1 shows, for each sector, the percentage of firms that have 
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any (at least one) minimum wage worker, denoted ‘anyMW’. Also shown in Table 2.1 
is the percentage of minimum wage workers, on average, employed within firms, 
denoted ‘% on MW’. In the second panel on the right of Table 2.1, we also show the 
‘% on MW’ conditional on firms that employ at least one minimum wage employee. 
For example, on average, 13.02 per cent of employees in firms in the accommodation 
sector are minimum wage workers and just under 50 per cent of firms in this sector 
employ at least one minimum wage employee. Of the firms in the accommodation 
sector that employ some minimum wage workers, the average incidence of firm-level 
minimum wage employment is 26.16 per cent. The five sectors with the highest 
concentration and intensity of minimum wage employment are accommodation, food 
and beverage, retail (excluding motor retail), manufacture (of food, drink and clothing) 
and domestic / personal services.5 At the other end of the spectrum, less than 1 per 
cent, on average, of employees within firms in the finance and insurance sector are 
paid the minimum wage, with under 10 per cent of firms in this sector employing at 
least one minimum wage worker. There are some sectors with very few firms 
employing minimum wage workers, but of the ones that do, the incidence of minimum 
wage employment is quite high. For example, less than 10 per cent of firms in the 
construction sector employ minimum wage workers. However, of the firms that do, 
approximately 18 per cent of their employees are on the minimum wage.  
 
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of Irish firms by the percentage of minimum wage 
workers employed within the firm. Approximately three-quarters of firms employ no 
minimum wage workers, with a further 12 per cent employing less than 10 per cent of 
their workforce on the minimum wage. Approximately 13 per cent of firms employ 
more than 10 per cent of their workforce on the minimum wage and just over 3 per 
cent have more than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage.  
 
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of firms by minimum wage intensity. We separately 
analyse the five sectors that employ the largest number of minimum wage workers, as 
shown in Table 2.1. We then combine the remaining sectors that employ fewer 
minimum wage workers into an ‘other’ sector grouping.6 The sectors with the greatest 
incidence of very high intensity minimum wage employment are the retail and 
accommodation and food sectors, where 7.64 per cent and 8.70 per cent of firms, 




5  Due to Nace sector groupings in the EHECS data, quarrying and mining workers are also included with manufacturing 
workers in food, drink and clothing. 
6  The accommodation and food sectors are combined into one ‘accommodation and food’ sector.  
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TABLE 2.1  CONCENTRATION OF MW EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR (2008-2016) 
 All Firms MW Firms  
Sector anyMW % % on MW Obs % on MW Obs 
Accommodation 49.77 13.02 6,767 26.16 3,368 
Food / beverage 43.67 13.86 8,782 31.75 3,835 
Retail 43.31 12.35 17,745 28.51 7,685 
Manufacture (food/drink/clothing) 33.12 8.32 5,900 25.13 1,954 
Domestic / personal services 28.05 7.65 9,118 27.26 2,558 
Residential care 27.31 2.32 5,998 8.50 1,638 
Education 27.07 2.48 5,293 9.16 1,433 
Motor retail/wholesale 24.78 2.97 3,216 12.00 797 
Non-motor wholesale 22.59 3.86 10,981 17.08 2,481 
Leasing/travel 22.17 4.10 3,591 18.50 796 
Health 21.36 1.19 3,890 5.59 831 
Manufacture (pharma/plastic) 20.36 2.06 4,071 10.13 829 
Publish/broadcasting 19.87 3.48 3,297 17.54 655 
Manufacture (wood/paper) 19.45 2.64 3,614 13.57 703 
Air transport/courier 19.09 1.68 2,609 8.81 498 
Manufacture (metal/electrical) 18.83 2.04 6,868 10.85 1,293 
Security/support services 18.39 2.99 4,307 16.26 792 
Social work 17.89 2.78 6,021 15.51 1,077 
Finance/real estate 17.40 1.91 4,183 10.98 728 
Public admin 17.15 0.40 3,925 2.32 673 
Manufacture (furniture) 16.50 1.88 3,225 11.41 532 
Transport (land/water) 16.36 2.98 2,708 18.19 443 
Elec/gas/water 15.94 2.37 1,487 14.86 237 
R&D & veterinary 13.19 2.44 2,873 18.51 379 
Legal/management/architecture 12.34 1.27 6,979 10.31 861 
IT 12.27 0.95 3,570 7.77 438 
Construction 9.59 1.75 8,163 18.29 783 
Finance/insurance 8.55 0.61 3,205 7.13 274 
Total 25.31 5.16 15,2386 20.39 38,571 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
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TABLE 2.2  DISTRIBUTION OF IRISH FIRMS BY MINIMUM WAGE INTENSITY (2008-2016) 
%MW Obs Per cent 
None 113,815 74.69 
Less than 10% 18,191 11.94 
10-20% 6,305 4.14 
20-30% 4,276 2.81 
30-40% 2,966 1.95 
40-50% 2,074 1.36 
50-60% 1,594 1.05 
60-70% 1,179 0.77 
70-80% 721 0.47 
80-90% 496 0.33 
90-100% 769 0.5 
Total 152,386 100 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
 
TABLE 2.3 DISTRIBUTION OF IRISH FIRMS BY MW INTENSITY  




































































Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
 
We pool all of the quarterly observations and calculate the average weekly earnings 
and average hourly earnings for our five sectoral groupings for each year from 2008 to 
2016. The average weekly earnings are shown in Figure 2.1 and the average hourly 
earnings in Figure 2.2. The graphs provide initial descriptive evidence that, on average, 
the 2016 minimum wage increase did not lead to substantial increases in average 
labour costs in sectors that employed larger numbers of minimum wage workers. The 
increases in average labour costs appear to be greatest in the ‘other’ sector that 
consists of firms with the lowest incidence of minimum wage employment. It is 
important to reiterate that we are studying a period of strong economic growth, with 
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a 4 per cent GDP growth rate in 2016 and a 2.5 per cent increase in average hourly 
earnings (ESRI, 2019). Therefore, earnings in general were growing throughout the 
economy during this period. As such, our analysis is framed in this context. If the 
minimum wage had increased by the same amount in a recessionary period, such as in 
2010 when GDP growth was negative and hourly earnings declined by 1.5 per cent 
(ESRI, 2013), it is possible that affected sectors would have seen greater relative 
growth in average labour costs. However, as mentioned earlier, the economic context 
is typically a key component in the decision to raise the minimum wage, and in this 
regard, our paper provides important evidence on the impact of a minimum wage 
increase in a growing economy.  
 


















2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
year
Retail Accommodation & Food
Manuf & Mining Household & Personal
Other
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Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
 
In Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we split firms into two groups: those with no minimum wage 
employees and those employing some (at least one) minimum wage employee. We 
plot the average firm-level hourly (Figure 2.3) and weekly (Figure 2.4) earnings for both 
groups across all sectors. On average, the labour costs for firms employing minimum 
wage workers did not appear to increase by more than the labour costs of firms 
employing no minimum wage workers following the 2016 increase. In Figures 2.5 and 
2.6, we further disaggregate minimum wage firms by the level of intensity. We show 
average labour costs over time for firms with more than 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 
30 per cent, etc., of their employees on the minimum wage. We go as far as 70 per 
cent, as going beyond this threshold leads to small sample sizes. Just 1 per cent of all 
observations consist of firms with more than 70 per cent of employees on the 
minimum wage. The overall sample size for the nine years for this group is just under 
2,000, with an average yearly sample size of 220.  
 
We see that average hourly and weekly wages for firms with no minimum wage 
workers are between 1.5 to 2 times higher than hourly and weekly wages of minimum 
wage firms. The higher the minimum wage intensity, the lower the average labour 
costs. The average weekly earnings in 2016 for firms with no minimum wage workers 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
year
Retail Accommodation & Food
Manuf & Mining Household & Personal
Other
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on the minimum wage. The average hourly earnings for these groups in 2016 was 
€21.51 and €11.35 respectively. While there are differences in the levels, in general, 
the trend in labour costs over time for all groups looks relatively similar. However, it is 
difficult to evaluate from the graphs alone whether the 2016 minimum wage increase 
had an impact on labour costs of affected firms. We will investigate this in further detail 
using more advanced econometric techniques.  
 
FIGURE 2.3 AVERAGE FIRM-LEVEL HOURLY EARNINGS (2008-2016) 
 
 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
year
MW Workers No MW Workers
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FIGURE 2.4 AVERAGE FIRM-LEVEL WEEKLY EARNINGS (2008-2016) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
 
FIGURE 2.5 AVERAGE FIRM-LEVEL HOURLY EARNINGS BY MW INTENSITY (2008-2016) 
 
 










2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
year











Data and descriptive statistics | 13 
FIGURE 2.6 AVERAGE FIRM-LEVEL WEEKLY EARNINGS BY MW INTENSITY (2008-2016) 
 
 























Our identification strategy involves comparing the outcomes of high intensity 
minimum wage firms to the outcomes of low intensity minimum wage firms. We 
exploit the panel characteristic of the data and implement a difference-in-differences 
type strategy. Our approach is similar to that used by Harasztosi and Lindner (2019), 
who investigate the impact of a minimum wage increase in Hungary. We implement 
the methodology using the following regression, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖    (1) 
where the outcome Yi,t is regressed on a year dummy, Yeart, which equals one for 2016 
and zero for 2015. The outcome variable is averaged across the four quarters for each 
year to produce a yearly average outcome for each firm. The variable MWi captures 
the exposure of firm i to the minimum wage and αi denotes firm fixed effects. We 
directly observe firms’ exposure to the minimum wage, MWi, which is defined as the 
percentage of minimum wage employees in firm i in the year before the minimum 
wage increase.7 The ability to precisely measure minimum wage exposure within firms 
is a significant advantage of our data. In the absence of such information, Harasztosi 
and Lindner (2019) must predict exposure based on average labour costs within the 
firm. The coefficient on the interaction term, β3, is our estimate of interest. This 
captures the relationship between exposure to the minimum wage and the outcome 
variable.8 For example, if the outcome variable is the log of average labour costs, then 
β3 can be interpreted as the difference in the change in labour costs (from 2015 to 
2016) of firms with 100 per cent of employees on the minimum wage, compared to 
firms with no minimum wage employees. A β3 of 0.05, for example, would indicate 
that, following the minimum wage increase, firms with 100 per cent of employees on 
the minimum wage experienced an increase in labour costs that was 5 per cent higher 
than firms with no minimum wage employees. We examine the following outcome 
variables: average weekly labour costs, average hourly labour costs, average hours 
worked (part-time and full-time), average overtime hours worked (part-time and full-
time) and employment (changes in the number of workers in the firm).  
 
When implementing the panel estimator, we restrict our sample to a balanced panel 




7  As with the outcome variable, this is averaged over four quarters in 2015 to produce a minimum wage intensity variable.  
8  Note that another way of estimating Equation (2) would be to regress the change in the outcome variable on MWi. This is 
the approach used by Harasztosi and Lindner (2019). Both approaches are identical and produce the same results.  
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In doing so, we restrict our sample size by ignoring observations that do not meet this 
criterion. However, we implement an additional estimator which pools all quarterly 
observations across all years to estimate a difference-in-differences model based on 
repeated yearly cross-sections. While the panel method has clear advantages, as we 
are following the same firms over time, the pooled model allows us to work with a 
larger sample size by including all of the observations. Each quarterly firm-level data 
point is treated as an independent observation. No restriction is made regarding the 
size of the panel dimension. A firm may appear for just one quarter in the data, or 
could be present for the full eight quarters. Therefore, for each year, we have a sample 
of quarterly firm-level observations. Each observation contains information on the 
percentage of minimum wage workers, along with information on the outcome 
variables as well as other additional covariates. Our pooled difference-in-differences 
estimator aggregates all observations within a given year, and examines how the 
average outcomes changed over time among firms of differing minimum wage 
intensities, relative to firms with no minimum wage workers. We estimate the pooled 
difference-in-differences model, with robust standard errors, using the following 
regression,  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏 +2016𝜏𝜏=2013 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′𝜃𝜃+𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    (2) 
 
We pool data for the years 2012 to 2016, giving us four pre-treatment years (2012 to 
2015) and one post-treatment year (2016). The variable 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏is a dummy variable for year 
𝜏𝜏.9 The variable Di is the treatment dummy variable which equals one for firms 
employing minimum wage workers and zero for firms with no minimum wage workers. 
As we have a larger sample size in the pooled model, we can estimate separate models 
to test for heterogeneous effects. By estimating separate models using various 
treatment indicators based on minimum wage intensity, we can investigate potential 
non-linear effects. For example, it may be the case that no effects are present for low 
intensity firms (e.g. over 10 per cent of workers on the minimum wage), but are 
present for higher intensity firms (e.g. over 50 per cent). Accordingly, we vary the 
definition of treatment according to the intensity of minimum wage employment 
within the firm. For example, we estimate a model where Di=1 if the firm has greater 
than 10 per cent of employees on the minimum wage. We then estimate models where 
the treatment threshold for minimum wage employment is 20 per cent, 30 per cent 
etc. The interaction term 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 equals one for treated firms in the period after the 




9  We include 2012 to 2015 as pre-treatment years. In January 2011 there was a temporary reduction in the minimum wage 
from €8.65 to €7.65 per hour, which was reversed in July of the same year. By including 2012 to 2015, we ensure that no 
policy change took place in any of the pre-treatment years. Furthermore, the period before 2011 was very different to the 
later years as it was characterised by a severe recession. Figure 2.4 indicates an absence of parallel trends between 
minimum wage and non-minimum wage firms in this period. For this reason also, we exclude these years from the analysis.  
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differences estimate. Finally, Xi,t’ is a vector of additional control variables, including 
firm size and the percentage of full-time employees in the firm. In addition to testing 
for heterogeneous effects by minimum wage intensity, we also estimate separate 
models for different sectors to examine whether the minimum wage has differential 
impacts across sectors. 
 
The validity of the difference-in-differences estimator is based on the assumption of 
parallel trends. In the absence of a policy change, the change in outcomes of the 
treated firms should be equal to that of the control firms. One way to verify the validity 
of this assumption is by examining whether parallel trends existed in the outcome 
variables prior to the policy change (i.e. prior to 2016). Figures 2.1 to 2.6 provide 
graphical evidence that is broadly consistent with the parallel trends assumption, by 
showing that the labour costs of minimum wage firms over time, prior to the policy 
change, was similar to non-minimum wage firms. However, as a more robust test of 
parallel trends, we undertake placebo analysis. This involves estimating our difference-
in-differences models on a time period where no policy change occurred. If we 
observed a statistically significant result in the treatment period and subsequently 
detect a statistically significant effect in the placebo period, this would call into 
question the validity of our results. However, if we observe a statistically significant 
treatment effect after the policy change and no effect in the placebo analysis, this is 
supportive of a causal effect of the minimum wage change. For the panel model, we 
implement the placebo analysis based on a full panel of firms for the years 2014 and 
2015, thereby designating 2015 as the placebo treatment year. For the pooled model, 
we also allocate 2015 as the placebo treatment year and implement the estimator 
using yearly cross-sections from 2012 to 2015.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
4.1 PANEL SPECIFICATION 
The results from estimating Equation (1), using various firm-level outcome variables, 
are shown in Table 4.1. We detect statistically significant effects for average labour 
costs. The point estimate in column (1) indicates that, following the 2016 minimum 
wage increase, average weekly labour costs increased by 5.4 per cent more in firms 
with 100 per cent of employees on the minimum wage relative to firms with no 
minimum wage workers. For average hourly labour costs, the effect is 2.8 per cent, but 
this is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. When looking at total 
average hours worked, column (3), the results indicate a slight increase in overall hours 
in the order of 2.6 per cent. However, again, this is only marginally statistically 
significant and should be interpreted with some caution, especially given the fact that 
no significant results emerge when we analyse full-time and part-time hours 
separately, in columns (4) and (5) respectively. In column (6), we use average overtime 
hours as our dependent variable, and in columns (7) and (8) we examine part-time 
overtime hours and full-time overtime hours separately. 
 
The following definition of overtime hours is listed in the survey instructions to 
employers. 
Overtime hours consists of hours worked in excess of contracted hours. 
These hours, irrespective of the hourly pay rate applied, should be 
entered as hours. For example, 2 hours worked at double time should 
still be regarded as 2 hours. Please exclude overtime hours where leave 
in lieu is taken instead of pay.  
 
We detect no effects on overtime hours. Note that when looking at overtime hours, 
we are faced with a reduced sample size. The reason is that some firms record zero 
overtime hours. As we are dealing with the log of hours as our dependent variable, 
these will be dropped from the analysis. Moreover, a firm that goes from some positive 
overtime hours, to no overtime after the minimum wage increase, would not be 
included. As such, we employ two additional specifications in columns (9) and (10), 
where we look at the probability of a firm offering some overtime hours. Our 
dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if a firm offers some overtime, 
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and zero if no overtime is recorded. Again, we detect no statistically significant 
effects.10  
 
In Table 4.2, we implement placebo analysis by estimating our model using the years 
2014 and 2015, during which time no minimum wage change occurred. Therefore, in 
Equation (1), the variable Yeart now equals one if the year is 2015 and zero for 2014. 
As we can see, there are no statistically significant results in the placebo analysis. This 
indicates that the statistically significant results detected in Table 4.1 are likely to be 
attributable to the 2016 minimum wage change, as opposed to any diverging trends 
between high and low intensity minimum wage firms that may have existed before the 
policy change.  
 
We examine whether the 2016 minimum wage increase had any impact on 
employment within high intensity minimum wage firms. To do so, we exploit a variable 
in the EHECS data that captures the percentage change in employment in any given 
quarter, relative to the previous quarter. As this employment outcome variable is 
reported as the difference between two time periods within firm i, our estimator for 
employment takes the form of a difference-in-difference-in-differences (D-i-D-i-D) 
strategy. We take two approaches. In the first approach, we look at the employment 
change in firm i from Quarter 4 of 2015 to Quarter 1 of 2016 compared to the change 
from Quarter 4 of 2014 to Quarter 1 of 2015. We then check whether the difference 
in these differences varied with minimum wage intensity (hence the D-i-D-i-D). The 
fact that we are using the D-i-D-i-D approach overcomes concerns regarding 
seasonality. For example, high intensity minimum wage firms may encounter seasonal 
changes to their outcome variables from Quarter 4 to Quarter 1 of any given year, 
which may be different to low intensity firms. However, as we are comparing the Q4 
to Q1 difference for firm i in the treatment period (2015 to 2016) with the Q4 to Q1 
difference in the previous non-treatment period (2014 to 2015), we implicitly control 
for seasonality. This estimator will detect any employment effects that occur 
immediately after the policy change. However, it is possible that employment effects 
take longer than one quarter to manifest. For our second approach, the dependent 
variable is the average change in employment across all four quarters of the year. The 
results for both specifications are shown in Table 4.3. We detect no employment 




10  We use a linear probability model, as the interaction terms in non-linear models such as logit or probit are not interpretable 
in the same way as standard linear regression, making it difficult to interpret the difference-in-differences coefficients 
(Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012). 
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TABLE 4.1 EFFECT OF 2016 MW INCREASE – PANEL ESTIMATION 


















Estimate 0.054*** 0.028* 0.026* 0.020 0.021 0.065 0.135 -0.069 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.043) (0.077) (0.148) (0.094) (0.045) (0.031) 
Year 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.004** 0.003* 0.009* -0.020 -0.034 -0.022 0.003 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.015) (0.030) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) 




0.363*** 0.962*** 0.970*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
           
Observations 3,896 3,896 3,896 3,878 3,444 2,347 1,496 2,283 3,896 3,896 
R-squared 0.070 0.044 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 
Number of 
firms 1,948 1,948 1,948 1,939 1,754 1,235 830 1,201 1,948 1,948 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE 4.2 PLACEBO ESTIMATES (2014 AND 2015)  
















D  0.009 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.055 -0.015 -0.195 0.060 -0.005 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.041) (0.150) (0.179) (0.146) (0.045) (0.028) 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 4.3 EFFECT OF 2016 MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON EMPLOYMENT 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Emp Change (Q4 2015 to Q1 2016) Av Emp Change(2015 to 2016) 
D-i-D Estimate -1.005 0.168 
 (4.721) (1.936) 
Year -0.250 -0.542** 
 (0.717) (0.246) 
Constant 2.366*** 2.015*** 
 (0.325) (0.113) 
   
Observations 3,896 3,896 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 
Number of firms 1,948 1,948 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4.2  POOLED DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES SPECIFICATION 
4.2.1 Average labour costs 
We begin by estimating Equation (2) using the log of average weekly and hourly labour 
costs as the dependent variables. We present separate results for each of the five 
different sectors for varying minimum wage intensities. As mentioned, the higher the 
minimum wage intensity threshold, the fewer the number of firms. For example, just 
over 3 per cent of firms have more than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum 
wage. The number of firms in a given year with more than 50 per cent of employees 
on the minimum wage is approximately 500. For firms with more than 60 per cent of 
employees on the minimum wage, the figure is just 300. Further disaggregating these 
samples by sector produces very few treated firms, leading to imprecise estimates. 
Note that the sample sizes may appear large in the high intensity threshold estimators. 
However, even though the sample sizes are large, the vast majority of these firms are 
not treated firms. As such, there is very little variation in the interaction variable that 
produces the difference-in-differences estimate (i.e. very few ‘1’s). As such, the degree 
of imprecision increases as the intensity threshold increases. Therefore, while we show 
results separately for each sector, up to the 40 per cent threshold, we show results for 
the very high intensity firms, (50 per cent – 70 per cent) by pooling the sectors together 
and including sectoral variables as covariates in the pooled difference-in-differences 
analysis. Note that we do not go beyond 70 per cent, as 99 per cent of firm-level 
observations have fewer than 70 per cent of minimum wage workers. The total yearly 
sample size for over 70 per cent of minimum wage workers is approximately 200 
(i.e. pooling all of the quarterly observations that record minimum wage intensity in 
excess of 70 per cent yields just 200 observations per year). 
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Table 4.4 shows results for average weekly earnings, where the treatment firms are 
those with more than 10 per cent of employees on the minimum wage and the control 
group are firms with no minimum wage employees. Additional controls include the size 
of the firm, the average weekly hours of employees in the firm and full time 
employment as a percentage of total employment. The difference-in-differences 
estimates are shown in the first row (D-i-D). The results indicate that firms with at least 
10 per cent of employees on the minimum wage did not see their average weekly wage 
bill increase by more than firms with no minimum wage workers. The coefficients on 
the treatment dummy variable, D, indicate that average wages in the treated groups 
(the minimum wage firms) are lower than average wages in the control groups. For 
firms in the accommodation and food sector and retail sector respectively, average 
weekly wages are 3.5 per cent and 10.5 per cent lower compared to non-minimum 
wage firms. The magnitude is higher, at approximately 30 per cent, for firms in the 
manufacturing, household and other sectors. The firm size coefficients show that 
average weekly wages are highest in the largest firms (with more than 500 employees). 
We also see that average weekly wages are higher in firms with more full-time 
employees and firms with higher average weekly working hours. Table 4.5 shows the 
corresponding results for average hourly earnings. As with weekly earnings, there is no 
effect on hourly earnings when treatment is defined as firms with over 10 per cent of 
employees on the minimum wage. 
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TABLE 4.4 EFFECT OF 2016 MW INCREASE ON AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS – TREATED: >10% ON MW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Acc & Food Retail Manuf Household Other 
D-i-D 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.014 0.031 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.032) (0.030) (0.015) 
D -0.287*** -0.035*** -0.105*** -0.305*** -0.228*** -0.336*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) 
Firm Size (Ref: 500+)      
3-19 -0.235*** 0.005 -0.113*** -0.459*** 0.105* -0.225*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.029) (0.061) (0.007) 
20-49 -0.177*** 0.107*** -0.181*** -0.354*** 0.235*** -0.152*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.028) (0.062) (0.008) 
50-99 -0.166*** 0.088*** -0.184*** -0.340*** 0.340*** -0.141*** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.011) (0.027) (0.062) (0.007) 
100-249 -0.153*** 0.075*** -0.126*** -0.395*** 0.251*** -0.122*** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.012) (0.026) (0.063) (0.008) 
250-499 -0.094*** 0.113*** -0.065*** -0.301*** 0.370*** -0.084*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.018) (0.028) (0.070) (0.009) 
Weekly hours 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Full-time (%) 0.726*** 0.119*** 0.322*** 0.480*** 0.585*** 0.721*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.015) (0.040) (0.027) (0.010) 
Year F.E.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.149*** 4.570*** 4.895*** 5.472*** 4.762*** 5.269*** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.018) (0.052) (0.066) (0.011) 
       
Observations 67,438 6,642 7,994 2,661 4,085 46,056 
R-squared 0.606 0.693 0.606 0.486 0.609 0.517 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 4.5 EFFECT OF 2016 MW INCREASE ON AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS – TREATED: >10% ON MW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Acc & Food Retail Manuf Household Other 
D-i-D 0.003 -0.007 -0.001 0.013 0.024 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.032) (0.029) (0.014) 
D -0.302*** -0.041*** -0.108*** -0.307*** -0.233*** -0.341*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007) 
Firm Size (Ref: 500+)      
3-19 -0.252*** -0.120*** -0.107*** -0.444*** 0.102* -0.243*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.029) (0.060) (0.007) 
20-49 -0.190*** -0.016 -0.182*** -0.346*** 0.234*** -0.162*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.027) (0.060) (0.007) 
50-99 -0.176*** -0.035** -0.188*** -0.336*** 0.341*** -0.145*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.027) (0.061) (0.007) 
100-249 -0.154*** -0.039*** -0.129*** -0.393*** 0.273*** -0.115*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.026) (0.062) (0.007) 
250-499 -0.093*** 0.001 -0.047*** -0.301*** 0.380*** -0.082*** 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) (0.069) (0.009) 
Weekly hours -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.001** -0.002* -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Full-time (%) 0.739*** 0.155*** 0.339*** 0.407*** 0.602*** 0.693*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.039) (0.026) (0.010) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.937*** 2.625*** 2.636*** 2.929*** 2.569*** 3.064*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.051) (0.065) (0.010) 
       
Observations 67,438 6,642 7,994 2,661 4,085 46,056 
R-squared 0.311 0.099 0.196 0.303 0.283 0.207 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We repeat our difference-in-differences analysis, separately by sector, for the 
alternative specifications where the treated group are firms with higher minimum 
wage intensities (20 to 40 per cent). While all specifications include the same 
additional covariates as Tables 4.4 and 4.5, for brevity we report the difference-in-
differences estimates only in Appendix Table A1. Even for these higher intensity 
minimum wage firms, we find that their average weekly and hourly labour costs did 
not increase by more than firms with no minimum wage employees. 
 
For firms with more than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage, we pool all 
sectors and include sectoral dummies. The difference-in-differences estimates for this 
pooled model are shown in Table 4.6. There is evidence that firms with greater than 
50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage experienced an increase in average 
weekly and hourly earnings that was 4.2 and 3.4 per cent higher, respectively, than 
firms with no minimum wage workers. For the highest intensity firms that we study, 
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those with over 70 per cent of minimum wage workers, the magnitude of the estimates 
is similar, however they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. It is 
important to note that there are relatively few firms with such a high level of minimum 
wage intensity; this can lead to large standard errors. These estimates are broadly in 
line with the estimates from the panel model, which showed that average weekly and 
hourly labour costs in fully saturated minimum wage firms (i.e. those with 100 per cent 
of workers on the minimum wage) increased by 5.4 per cent and 2.8 per cent more, 
respectively, relative to firms with no minimum wage workers.  
 
We estimate placebo models to verify the validity of the estimates detected in 
Table 4.6. This involves estimating the same regression, but designating 2015 as the 
treatment year, as opposed to the true treatment year of 2016. The placebo results 
are shown in Appendix Table A2. For weekly earnings, our main analysis (Table 4.3) 
indicated that the 2016 minimum wage increase was associated with higher labour 
costs of approximately 4 per cent for firms with more than 50 per cent of workers on 
the minimum wage. The estimates were statistically significant for the 50 per cent and 
60 per cent minimum wage intensity thresholds. In the placebo analysis, there is a 
marginally significant coefficient for the 50 per cent group, with a point estimate of 
3.4 per cent. The point estimates for the 60 and 70 per cent groups are not significant, 
and are lower in magnitude, at 1.7 and 1.4 per cent respectively, compared to the 
treatment coefficients of 4 per cent. However, some caution is called for, as the 
placebo analysis shows positive and statistically significant coefficients for the 30 and 
40 per cent group. As such, it may be the case that average weekly labour costs were 
increasing more for some mid-intensity minimum wage firms, relative to firms with no 
minimum wage workers, even before the minimum wage was increased. The results 
of the pooled model, taken in conjunction with the panel results presented earlier, 
tend to indicate that the 2016 minimum wage increase led to higher weekly labour 
costs among very high intensity minimum wage firms, compared to firms with no 
minimum wage workers.  
 
A similar pattern emerges for average hourly earnings. Our main analysis showed a 
statistically significant increase in average hourly earnings, of 3.4 per cent, among firms 
with more than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage. We detect no such 
impact in the placebo analysis. However, as with weekly earnings, the placebo analysis 
shows positive and statistically significant coefficients for the 30 and 40 per cent 
groups.  
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TABLE 4.6 EFFECT OF 2016 MW INCREASE ON AVERAGE LABOUR COSTS – TREATED: >50% TO >70% 
ON MW 
 (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Average Weekly Earnings Average Hourly Earnings 
D-i-D: >50% 0.042** 0.034** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
D-i-D: >60% 0.041** 0.029 
 (0.021) (0.020) 
D-i-D: >70% 0.040 0.027 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
A number of factors warrant attention when interpreting the results on average labour 
costs. Firstly, the minimum wage increase occurred during a time of strong economic 
growth, during which time wages were increasing generally across the labour market. 
Had the same increase been implemented during a time of recession, with flat or 
negative wage growth, it is possible that affected firms would have seen a stronger 
increase in their relative labour costs. Secondly, spillover effects may impact the wages 
of higher paid workers as individuals strive to preserve their relative position in the 
wage distribution (Dube et al., 2019). Redmond et al. (2019) document spillovers up to 
the 25th percentile of the wage distribution following the 2016 minimum wage increase 
in Ireland. If spillovers occur across firms, as well as within firms, then it is possible that 
the 2016 minimum wage increase also affected the average labour costs of firms 
employing no minimum wage workers. While perceptions of fairness and wage 
spillovers have been found to exist among co-workers within organisations (see, e.g. 
Card et al., 2012; Breza et al., 2018; Dube et al., 2019), there is also evidence that 
minimum wages can increase reservation wages generally (Falk et al., 2006), which 
could lead to increased labour costs in firms with no minimum wage workers.  
 
It is also important to note that minimum wage employees typically work fewer hours 
than higher paid workers (Maître et al., 2017). This will have a dampening effect on 
the impact on overall labour costs. We can illustrate this using a hypothetical example. 
Consider a firm with 20 per cent of their employees on the minimum wage and the 
remaining 80 per cent earning €17 per hour, which is approximately the median wage 
over these years. Assume that the minimum wage employees each work 20 hours per 
week and the higher paid employees each work 40 hours per week. If the higher paid 
workers’ wages remain constant, a 6 per cent minimum wage increase would only 
increase average weekly and hourly labour costs by 0.3 per cent. Therefore, due to 
lower average hours worked by minimum wage employees generally, the full 
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percentage increase in the minimum wage does not fully pass through into changes in 
total average labour costs.  
4.2.2  Hours worked 
We begin by looking at overall average hours worked within the firm. Table 4.7 shows 
results for each sector where treatment is defined as firms employing more than 
10 per cent of their workforce on the minimum wage.11 There is no evidence that the 
minimum wage increase significantly impacted the overall average hours worked 
within firms in any of the five sectors. In Appendix Table A3, we gather the difference-
in-differences estimates from our alternative specifications that use different 
definitions of minimum wage intensity, i.e. >20% to >70%, to identify treatment firms. 
Again, we see no clear evidence of impacts on the overall hours worked within affected 
firms.  
 
We estimate our difference-in-differences model separately for average part-time and 
average full-time hours worked. For brevity, and for the remainder of the analysis, we 
collect all of our estimates from the different minimum wage intensity thresholds, 
along with the estimates from the placebo analysis, and plot them graphically. The 
estimates for part-time hours worked are shown in Figure 4.1. We indicate statistical 
significance using the conventional labels that are used in tables throughout the 
paper.12 The difference-in-differences estimates for the treatment year indicate a 
decrease in part-time hours in high intensity minimum wage firms following the 
minimum wage increase. Specifically, there was a decrease of 5.3 per cent in average 
part-time hours in firms with over 60 per cent of workers on the minimum wage, 
relative to firms with no minimum wage workers. The point estimate for firms with 
over 70 per cent of workers on the minimum wage was almost identical (5.2 per cent), 
however it is not statistically significant. Again, it is worth noting that as we increase 
the minimum wage intensity threshold, a greater degree of imprecision is introduced 
due to fewer treated firms, which can lead to large standard errors. We do not observe 
any negative part-time hours effect when we run the placebo analysis. For the 60 and 
70 per cent thresholds, the placebo estimates are not statistically significant. However, 
for the 30, 40 and 50 per cent thresholds, the estimates are positive and statistically 
significant. Prior to the minimum wage change, some mid-intensity minimum wage 
firms may have experienced an increase in the number of part-time hours. Despite the 
presence of positive effects in our placebo analysis, our finding of negative effects for 




11  As hours worked is our outcome variable, we do not include it as a covariate. The same applies for the percentage of full-
time workers.  
12  A label of * indicates significance at 10 per cent, ** 5 per cent and * 1 per cent. No label indicates the estimates are not 
statistically significant.  
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Had we found negative and significant impacts in the placebo years, then we could not 
have attributed our negative hours finding in the treatment year to the minimum wage 
increase. If the positive findings in the placebo years were indicative of a positive hours 
trend before the policy change, then it is possible that our estimates of negative effects 
in the treatment year are an understatement. However, some caution is called for. If 
the placebo effects are indicative of year-on-year volatility in hours, we should be 
cautious in interpreting our treatment results too strongly. However, it is worth 
restating that the negative hours effect for the treatment year occurs for the 60 per 
cent group, with no effect in the placebo year for this same group. 
 
TABLE 4.7 EFFECT OF 2016 MW INCREASE ON AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS – TREATED: >10% ON MW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Acc & Food Retail Manuf Household Other 
D-i-D 0.002 0.001 -0.011 0.001 0.033 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.031) (0.013) 
D -0.100*** -0.008 -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.112*** -0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.006) 
Firm Size (Ref: 500+)     
3-19 -0.118*** 0.035 -0.008 -0.206*** -0.302*** -0.100*** 
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.012) (0.015) (0.067) (0.006) 
20-49 -0.045*** 0.140*** 0.018 -0.117*** -0.193*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.030) (0.013) (0.015) (0.067) (0.007) 
50-99 -0.029*** 0.192*** 0.034*** -0.052*** -0.164** -0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.030) (0.012) (0.014) (0.068) (0.006) 
100-249 -0.019*** 0.217*** 0.024* -0.072*** -0.211*** -0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.030) (0.013) (0.014) (0.069) (0.007) 
250-499 0.029*** 0.262*** -0.042** -0.022 -0.020 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.035) (0.020) (0.015) (0.076) (0.008) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.476*** 3.110*** 3.314*** 3.684*** 3.488*** 3.497*** 
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.012) (0.014) (0.067) (0.006) 
       
Observations 69,168 6,843 8,179 2,670 4,447 47,029 
R-squared 0.033 0.051 0.013 0.124 0.052 0.016 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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FIGURE 4.1 D-I-D AND PLACEBO ESTIMATES FOR PART-TIME HOURS WORKED 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
FIGURE 4.2 D-I-D AND PLACEBO ESTIMATES FOR FULL-TIME HOURS WORKED 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the corresponding estimates for average full-time hours. There is 
evidence of an increase in average full-time hours following the 2016 minimum wage 
increase. Specifically, firms with over 50 per cent of workers on the minimum wage 
saw an increase in average full-time hours that was approximately 2 per cent higher 
than firms with no minimum wage workers. We observe no statistically significant 
effects for the placebo analysis. This is consistent with theoretical predictions, and 
previous empirical evidence, relating to labour-labour substitution between full-time 
and part-time workers. Assuming that full-time workers are generally more productive 
than part-time workers, then firms may substitute away from lower productivity 
workers towards higher productivity workers if the wages of lower productivity 
workers increase due to a minimum wage (Fairris and Bujanda, 2008). This may explain 
the reduction in average part-time coinciding with an increase in full-time hours.  
 
We next look at overtime hours. Our sample sizes are smaller when looking at overtime 
due to unreported information.13 In addition, not all firms offer overtime; of the firms 
that report overtime information, just under 9 per cent report offering zero overtime 
hours. When using the log of hours as the outcome variable, the zeros will be dropped 
from the analysis. Therefore, as with the panel estimation, we implement two types of 
specification. The first uses the log of overtime hours as the dependent variable and 
the second estimates the probability that the firm offers any overtime hours. 
Therefore, the dependent variable equals one if the firm offers at least one hour of 
overtime, and zero if they report offering no overtime. As we are dealing with a smaller 
sample size, we estimate the pooled model, with the inclusion of sectoral dummies, as 
opposed to separate models for each sector. Furthermore, while in previous analyses 
we went as far as the 70 per cent threshold, in this analysis, we go as far as 50 per cent, 
due to small numbers of high intensity minimum wage firms in this restricted sample. 
We disaggregate overtime hours by reporting separate results for average overtime 
hours of part-time workers and average overtime hours of full-time workers.  
 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the results for part-time overtime hours. In Figure 4.3, we see 
that the estimated coefficients for the log of part-time overtime hours following the 
2016 minimum wage change are all negative. While the some of the coefficients are 
relatively large in magnitude, for example a 10 per cent reduction in part-time 
overtime hours for firms with more than 40 per cent of minimum wage employees, the 
estimated effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The placebo 




13  From 2008 to 2016, overtime information is not reported for approximately half of the observations.  
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statistically significant. The results for the probability of offering part-time overtime 
hours (Figure 4.4) are more compelling. The estimated impacts for the treatment 
period decrease steadily with minimum wage intensity. Firms with over 50 per cent of 
employees on the minimum wage were almost six percentage points less likely to offer 
any overtime hours following the 2016 minimum wage increase, relative to firms with 
no minimum wage employees. The placebo analysis reveals no statistically significant 
effects. Taken together, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are suggestive of a decrease in part-time 
overtime hours among high intensity minimum wage firms, following the 2016 
minimum wage increase.  
 
FIGURE 4.3 D-I-D COEFFICIENTS FOR PART-TIME OVERTIME HOURS 
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FIGURE 4.4 D-I-D COEFFICIENTS FOR PROBABILITY OF PART-TIME OVERTIME HOURS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the results for full-time overtime hours. In Figure 4.5, there 
is evidence to suggest that some high intensity minimum wage firms reduced the 
number of full-time overtime hours. Firms with over 30 and 40 per cent of minimum 
wage workers saw a 12 per cent reduction in full-time overtime hours relative to firms 
with no minimum wage workers. However, the coefficient for the 50 per cent plus 
group is not statistically significant, nor of a similar magnitude to the 30 and 40 per 
cent groups. The placebo analysis shows no statistically significant effect and the sign 
of all the placebo coefficients are marginally positive. Regarding the probability of full-
time overtime hours, no clear evidence emerges regarding any impact associated with 
the 2016 minimum wage increase (Figure 4.6). 
 
Taken together, the results on overtime suggest there may have been a decrease in 
overtime hours among high intensity minimum wage firms following the 2016 
minimum wage increase. However, some of the results provide only weak evidence of 
negative hours effects. The strongest, and most compelling results relate to the 
probability a firm offers overtime to part-time workers. Following the 2016 minimum 
wage increase, firms with over 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage 
reduced the probability of offering overtime to part-time workers by approximately six 
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note that these effects are emerging among a very small minority of firms, as just 3 per 
cent of firms fall into this category (i.e. have more than 50 per cent of employees on 
the minimum wage).14 
 
FIGURE 4.5 D-I-D COEFFICIENTS FOR FULL-TIME OVERTIME HOURS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 






14  We re-estimate our full-time and part-time hours models (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) using the restricted sample of firms that 
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FIGURE 4.6 D-I-D COEFFICIENTS FOR PROBABILITY OF FULL-TIME OVERTIME HOURS 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
4.3 ROBUSTNESS TEST: LOW WAGE RESTRICTION 
In the pooled difference-in-differences analysis, we have used firms with no minimum 
wage workers as a control group, which forms the basis for comparing our treated 
firms of varying minimum wage intensity. As such, the control group, by construction, 
will be different from the treated firms as they will consist of higher paid employees. 
Some control firms are likely to consist of very high paid employees, in which case they 
may not be a valid comparison to the lower paid treated firms. As a robustness test, 
we restrict our sample to low paid firms only, thereby ensuring that we do not include 
the very high paid firms in the control group, which should improve comparability. 
Defining who is and who is not a low paid firm is arbitrary. As a robustness test, we 
omit firms with average hourly wages above the 75th percentile of the hourly wage 
distribution (or €24.50) and re-estimate our models. The results are shown in Table 4.8 
and are broadly consistent with our baseline estimates. Hourly and weekly earnings 
increased by approximately 3 per cent and 4 per cent respectively among high intensity 
minimum wage firms, relative to firms with no minimum wage employees. There is 
also evidence of a decrease in part-time hours, of approximately 5 per cent, and a 
corresponding increase in full-time hours, of approximately 2 per cent, among high 
intensity firms. Finally, firms with more than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum 
wage were five percentage points less likely to have any part-time overtime hours 
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TABLE 4.8 ROBUSTNESS TESTS, LOW WAGE FIRMS 
 Minimum Wage Intensity 
 50+ 60+ 70+ 
Hourly Earnings 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.033** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) 
 n=41,761 n=40,881 n=40,265 
    
Weekly Earnings 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.044** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) 
 n=41,761 n=40,881 n=40,265 
    
Total Hours -0.008 -0.003 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) 
 n=43,289 n=42,396 n=41,757 
    
Part-time Hours -0.011 -0.053** -0.053 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.034) 
 n=35,953 n=35,123 n=34,547 
    
Full-time Hours 0.018** 0.017* 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
 n=41,755 n=40,875 n=40,260 
    
 Overtime Hours 
  50+  
Part-time Overtime   -0.035  
  (0.103)  
  n=9,040  
    
Full-time Overtime  -0.069  
  (0.099)  
  n=16,336  
    
Pr(Part-time Overtime)  -0.051**  
  (0.025)  
  n=10,042  
    
Pr(Full-time Overtime)  -0.019  
  (0.019)  
  n=17,327  
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 





In 2016, the minimum wage in Ireland increased by almost 6 per cent. Increases to the 
minimum wage may have differential impacts on firms, depending on the percentage 
of employees they have on the minimum wage. Using unique data that accurately 
capture the percentage of employees earning the minimum wage within firms, we 
estimate the impact of a minimum wage increase on average labour costs and hours 
worked. We examine whether these effects varied depending on the intensity of firm-
level minimum wage employment.  
 
We show that, in Ireland, approximately three-quarters of firms do not employ any 
minimum wage employees. Approximately 13 per cent have more than 10 per cent of 
their employees on the minimum wage, while just over 3 per cent of firms have more 
than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage.  
 
Our analysis indicates that, following the 2016 minimum wage increase, average 
weekly labour costs increased by 5.4 per cent more in firms with 100 per cent of 
employees on the minimum wage relative to firms with no minimum wage workers. 
Further analysis based on varying minimum wage intensities within firms indicates that 
the increased labour costs appear to be confined to the very high intensity firms, i.e. 
those with more than half of their employees on the minimum wage. It is important to 
note that these high intensity (50 per cent plus) minimum wage firms account for just 
three per cent of all firms. For firms with between 10 and 50 per cent of employees on 
the minimum wage, we detect no statistically significant impact on average labour 
costs. Therefore, the increase in labour costs among most firms employing minimum 
wage workers was similar to the increase in labour costs for firms with no minimum 
wage workers. 
 
It is important to interpret these results in light of the strong economic performance 
during this time. This was a period of strong GDP growth, declining unemployment and 
increasing earnings. Therefore, the wages of employees were increasing generally 
throughout the labour market, even in firms with no minimum wage workers. Had the 
same minimum wage increase been applied during a period of recession, where wages 
were flat or even declining, it is possible that affected firms would have seen a sharper 
rise in their relative labour costs. An additional factor to consider when interpreting 
these results relates to possible wage spillovers. Existing evidence suggests that wage 
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spillovers occur to higher paid employees following a minimum wage increase, as 
individuals value their relative standing in the wage distribution. If these spillovers 
occur across firms, as well as within firms, then the minimum wage increase could also 
have increased the average labour costs in firms with no minimum wage workers.  
 
The fact that average labour costs among the lower intensity minimum wage firms did 
not increase substantially may be explained, to some extent, by minimum wage 
employees generally working fewer hours than higher paid employees. To illustrate 
this, consider a firm with 20 per cent of their workforce on the minimum wage and the 
remaining 80 per cent earning the 2016 median wage. If the minimum wage employees 
work 20 hours per week, and the higher paid employees work full-time at 40 hours per 
week, then the 2016 minimum wage increase of six per cent would increase average 
labour costs by just 0.3 per cent, assuming constant wages for the higher paid workers.  
 
A unique contribution of our paper has been the detailed study of overtime hours. We 
have shown that, in response to the 2016 minimum wage increase, firms with more 
than 50 per cent of employees on the minimum wage reduced the probability of 
offering any overtime hours to part-time workers by almost six percentage points. 
There is some evidence of an increase in the number of full-time hours which coincided 
with a decrease in part-time hours. This is consistent with theoretical predictions of 
labour-labour substitution whereby employers substitute from lower productivity to 
higher productivity workers following an increase in the wages of low productivity 
workers. Finally, we do not find any evidence of a reduction in the number of 
employees among high intensity minimum wage firms following the 2016 minimum 
wage increase. 
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APPENDIX  SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
 
TABLE A1  EFFECT OF 2016 MINIMUM WAGE INCREASE ON AVERAGE LABOUR COSTS – TREATED: 
>20% TO >40% ON MW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Acc & Food Retail Manuf Household Other 
Average Weekly Earnings 
D-i-D: >20% 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.021 0.013 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.036) (0.034) (0.019) 
D-i-D: >30% 0.017 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.019 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.041) (0.039) (0.025) 
D-i-D: >40% 0.018 0.018 0.021 -0.019 -0.022 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.046) (0.045) (0.031) 
Average Hourly Earnings 
D-i-D: >20% 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.022 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.035) (0.033) (0.019) 
D-i-D: >30% 0.008 -0.007 0.003 0.012 0.011 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.040) (0.038) (0.024) 
D-i-D: >40% 0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.018 -0.033 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.046) (0.044) (0.031) 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
TABLE A2 PLACEBO ANALYSIS FOR AVERAGE WEEKLY AND HOURLY EARNINGS 
 Minimum Wage Intensity 
 10+ 20+ 30+ 40+ 50+ 60+ 70+ 
Weekly Earnings 0.007 0.015 0.029** 0.038** 0.035* 0.017 0.014 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032) 
        
Hourly Earnings 0.004 0.011 0.022* 0.032** 0.028 0.013 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.031) 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A3 EFFECT OF 2016 MW INCREASE ON AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS – TREATED: >20% TO >40% 
ON MW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All Acc & Food Retail Manuf Household Other 
Average Weekly Hours 
D-i-D: >20% 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 0.017 0.018 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.035) (0.017) 
D-i-D: >30% -0.006 -0.013 0.013 -0.014 0.019 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.040) (0.021) 
D-i-D: >40% -0.010 -0.024 0.017 -0.014 0.012 -0.023 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.046) (0.026) 
D-i-D: >50% -0.007 - - - - - 
 (0.014) - - - - - 
D-i-D: >60% -0.003 - - - - - 
 (0.018) - - - - - 
D-i-D: >70% 0.016 - - - - - 
 (0.022) - - - - - 
 
Source: Authors’ analyses based on Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs data. 
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